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Abstract
Background: To ensure equity and accessibility of public health care in rural areas, the Chinese central government
has launched a series of policies to motivate village doctors to provide basic public health services. Using chronic
disease management and prevention as an example, this study aims to identify factors associated with village
doctors’ basic public health services provision and to formulate targeted interventions in rural China.
Methods: Data was obtained from a survey of village doctors in three provinces in China in 2014. Using a
multistage sampling process, data was collected through the self-administered questionnaire. The data was then
analyzed using multilevel logistic regression models.
Results: The high-level basic public health services for chronic diseases (BPHS) provision rate was 85.2 % among
the 1149 village doctors whom were included in the analysis. Among individual level variables, more education,
more training opportunities, receiving more public health care subsidy (OR = 3.856, 95 % CI: 1.937–7.678, and
OR = 4.027, 95 % CI: 1.722–9.420), being under integrated management (OR = 1.978, 95 % CI: 1.132–3.458), and
being a New Cooperative Medical Scheme insurance program-contracted provider (OR = 2.099, 95 % CI: 1.187–3.712)
were associated with the higher BPHS provision by village doctors. Among county level factors, Foreign Direct
Investment Index showed a significant negative correlation with BPHS provision, while the government funding for
BPHS showed no correlation (P > 0.100).
Conclusion: Increasing public health care subsidies received by individual village doctors, availability and attendance
of training opportunities, and integrated management and NCMS contracting of village clinics are important factors in
increasing BPHS provision in rural areas.
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Background
Village doctors are on the front lines of health care
provision [1] and, at one point in time, greatly improved
the equity and accessibility of public health care in rural
China. A three-tiered rural health system was established
in the 1960s [2], where village clinics serve the bottom-
tier. The “barefoot doctor” training program was imple-
mented to create a primary workforce for public health
care [3] and provide basic medical services [4] to rural
populations. These barefoot doctors were local farmers
who were recruited, trained, and supported through the
Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) [5]. CMS was a
highly collective medical organization, operated privately
by the barefoot doctors [6] and subsidized by public
funds of local people’s communes. Under such situation,
barefoot doctors worked as half-peasant-half-doctor with
limited medical knowledge, but they alleviated the short-
age of medicine successfully. By the 1970s, they im-
proved the quality and accessibility of health care in
rural China, which was deemed by the World Health
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Organization’s Declaration of Alma-Ata to be an inter-
national model for providing primary health care [7].
However, along with economic reform during the early
1980s, the barefoot doctor system ceased and local gov-
ernments took over the provision of rural public health
care services. Due to the collapse of the CMS, the central
government dramatically reduced health care funding in
rural areas [8]. The barefoot doctors became unemployed
and those who passed a qualifying examination reemerged
as “village doctors” as designated by the Ministry of
Health [9]. No longer were there effective incentives en-
couraging village doctors to provide unprofitable public
health care services [10, 11]. Instead, the economic reform
forced village doctors to seek income in other ways, spe-
cifically, shifting their focus to fee-for-service medical
activities [12] and profits from the 15 % markup on pre-
scribed drugs dispensed to patients [13]. Though village
doctors still served as the bottom-tier of the rural health
system, the government did not provide any models or
guidelines to help support them through the changes to
health service provision [14]. Thus, the changes brought
about by privatization left local residents holding lower
respect of village doctors. Since supporting basic public
health services became the responsibility of local govern-
ments and due to the urban versus rural economic dispar-
ity, health equity declined greatly [15–18]. Residents in
rural areas often struggled to meet their health care needs
and suffered from heavy disease burden [19, 20]. It
became a serious threat to the health of rural residents in
China [21–24].
Providing good quality and accessible public health
care for rural population is an important issue for Chinese
healthcare reform [25]. The Chinese government launched
the Health Sector Reform in 2009 with one of the goals
being to provide a package of basic public health services
including health records creation for every resident, health
education, immunization, chronic disease (hypertension
and diabetes) management, severe mental diseases patient
management, maternal and child health care services,
elderly health care, and so forth [26]. However, there
are still significant provision variations among different
basic public health items. As an example, previous studies
have showed that, for immunization as well as maternal
and child health care services [27,28] were traditionally
well provided by village doctors, while the provision of
chronic disease management and prevention was ex-
tremely low [29]. These newly added items of basic public
health services for chronic diseases (abbreviated here as
BPHS) increased the workload of village doctors naturally.
In practice, however, the quantity and quality of BPHS
provision vary among different village doctors [26, 30].
To achieve the goal of providing basic public health
services, the Health Sector Reform also formulated a
series of strategies to “build a strong rural health service
network,” such as providing more training for, strength-
ening management to, and improving subsidies for
village doctors [31]. Providing routine training programs
is the first requirement for increasing provision and im-
proving consistency of BPHS. Content of such trainings
include health care policy, standards, and BPHS quality
management. As most village doctors begin to work im-
mediately after obtaining their secondary school degree
[32], on-the-job training is essential to ensure the quality
of their services [33], especially regarding BPHS [30].
Fortunately, since the Health Sector Reform in 2009, the
central government has required township health cen-
ters (THCs) to devise structured and tailored training
programs to update village doctors’ knowledge and tech-
niques on public health services.
There are also other new political strategies incentiviz-
ing and supervising BPHS provision by village doctors.
In 2003, the Chinese government initiated the New Co-
operative Medical Scheme (NCMS), a government-run
voluntary insurance program for rural residents [34],
which has covered almost all of the targeted population
in China since 2010 [35]. However, not all village clinics
are NCMS-contracted providers, thereby possibly influ-
encing patient choice of health care provider due to
availability of reimbursements, which would affect BPHS
provision by village doctors [5]. Also, in 2009, integrated
management was established, that is, the THCs began
take on responsibility for the management of the village
clinics, including medicine, personnel, finance, facilities,
routine work, etc. Additionally, all work related to the
public health services of village doctors was under the
supervision and management of THCs, which signifi-
cantly affected village doctors’ income structure [5] and
pushed a shift in focus of their daily work from medical
services toward public health.
Lastly, subsidies given to village doctors’ subsidies on
BPHS is also one major strategy carried out since the
Health Sector Reform. The central government created a
specific fund, the “basic public health service fund”, allo-
cated to the THCs for distribution to village doctors to
motivate them to provide basic public health services.
The central government dictated an increase in amount
of the funds from ¥25 (US $4.033) per person in the ser-
vice population in 2012 to ¥40 (US $6.453) in 2015.
However, the actual subsidy received per person differs
by county since local government may also add to the
fund provided by the central governmental according to
the local fiscal status. While the subsidy in some counties
remains at national standard with no local government
supplementation, in some eastern counties with sufficient
supply from local financing, it reaches ¥100 (US $16.132).
Furthermore, there are also some other factors affecting
village doctors’ behavior collectively. For example, village
doctors living in different geographic counties or counties
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with different levels of economic openness may hold
different views on the provision of BPHS.
Village doctors’ personal BPHS provision is deeply
affected by the county-level factors, as well as by individ-
ual characteristics. However, limited studies concerning
both level factors are available. Hence, this study aimed
to investigate the factors associated with village doctors’
BPHS provision at both individual and county levels and
to provide possible policy recommendations to improve
public health care equity and accessibility in rural area.
Methods
Data
This study used a multi-stage sampling design. First,
three provinces were selected to represent each eco-
nomic region of China (eastern, middle, and western) as
previously defined by the government. Within each
province, counties were designated as rich or poor based
on available socioeconomic status data, then two rich
counties and two relatively poor counties were chosen
randomly within each designation. Health care managers
helped to call all local village doctors to the THCs on
the day of visit. Each THC governed approximately 20
village clinics, and each clinic generally had one village
doctor (for those have two doctors, only one doctor was
invited to participant), totaling 20 village doctors on
average in each THC. The research team visited the se-
lected THCs, and all village doctors present were invited
to participate in the survey. To ensure confidentiality,
no respondent identifiers were recorded. All respondents
finished their questionnaires on their own, but research
staffs were available and ready to address any questions
raised by respondents. All eligible village doctors agreed
to participate. The final sample consisted of 1149 village
doctors in 12 county-level units with between 100 and
140 village doctors representing each county (Fig. 1).
Ethics approval for this study was obtained from Peking




Provision of BPHS by village doctors was assessed using
a questionnaire that included three items: “Do you man-
age hypertension diseases for local residents?”, “Do you
manage diabetes for local residents?”, and “Do you cre-
ate health records for all citizens?”, all with the response
categories “yes” and “no”. Responses were given a value
of 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”, and the sum score thus
ranged from 0 to 3. As all three are essential BPHS ser-
vices [36], village doctors who scored 0, 1, or 2 were
considered to be low-level BPHS providers (coded 0)
and village doctors with scores of 3 were considered to
be high-level providers (coded 1).
Individual-level variables
Participation in training programs was measured by:
“How many times did you participate in village doctors
training programs during the last 3 years?” Monthly
public health care subsidy received was measured by:
“How much do you earn monthly from the government
for public health services?” Three categories were cre-
ated from the responses: none (0), 1–300 Chinese Yuan
(CNY) (1), and more than 300 CNY (2).
Fig. 1 Flow chart for the sampling
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Integrated management was measured by three ques-
tions: “Do THCs manage the finances of your village
clinic?”, “Do THCs manage the personnel salary of your
village clinic?”, and “Do THCs manage medical drugs of
your village clinic?” Responses for each were recorded
on a three-point scale: “total”, “partial”, and “none”. Re-
sponses were given a value of 2 for “total”, 1 for “partial,”
and 0 for ‘none’, and the sum score ranged from 0 to 6.
Village clinics, which scored 0, 1, 2, or 3, were consid-
ered as low level of integrated management (coded 0),
while village clinics with scores of 4, 5, or 6 were consid-
ered high level (coded 1).
NCMS-contracted was measured by one question: “Is
your village clinic a NCMS-contracted medical institu-
tion?” with response categories ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Responses
were given a value of 1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’.
Control variables included age (20–39, 40–59, and 60
or over), gender, and education level (completion of jun-
ior high school or less, completion of secondary school,
higher than secondary school). Participants’ average
monthly income ranged from 0 to 4000 CNY and was
separated into three categories of equal proportion: low,
average, and high (Additional file 1).
County-level variables
Three county-level variables were included in the analysis:
(i) geological characteristics, (ii) Foreign Direct Investment
Index (FDI Index), the ratio between foreign direct invest-
ment and gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013, reveal-
ing the openness of the local economy [37], and (iii)
funding of BPHS, from central and local government
budgets, expressed as funding for each local resi-
dent (Additional file 2).
Analyses
All analyses were conducted using STATA version 12.0.
Descriptive statistics were used to describe the character-
istics of the study population. To determine the differ-
ences in individual variables according to BPHS provision,
Chi-squared tests and t-tests were performed. To model
the effects of compositional (individual level) and context-
ual (county level) variables on BPHS provision by village
doctors, the data was fitted using a logistic regression with
village doctors’ reported provision of BPHS as the out-
come. Odds ratios (ORs) and their 95 % confidence inter-
vals (CIs) for BPHS provision were analyzed using
multilevel logistic regression models, adjusting for both
individual and county level variables as fixed effects and
allowing for heterogeneity between counties. A series of
five models was performed with Model 1 as a null model
containing no explanatory variables. Intra-class correlation
coefficient (ICC) was computed to examine the necessity
of fitting multilevel models. Model 2 included all the con-
trol confounders at the individual level. Model 3 and
Model 4 added individual and county level variables, re-
spectively, into Model 2. Model 5 added both individual
and county level variables into Model 2. Comparing
Models 3 through 5, the impacts of compositional and
contextual variables on provision of BPHS and their
changes after controlling for each other were assessed.
Results
Descriptive statistics of the sample
At the individual level, a considerable number of respon-
dents were male (75.2 %), were between 40 and 59 years
old (53.1 %), held a secondary school degree (68.1 %),
and earned a monthly subsidy between 1 and 300 CNY
for public health service (59.0 %). On average, each vil-
lage doctor had attended 12.7 (±8.791) trainings in the
last 3 years. In regards to central policies, 671 (52.4 %)
village doctors worked in a clinic with high-level inte-
grated management and 787 (68.5 %) belonged to
NCMS-contracted provider clinics. At the community
level, more than half of the counties were in the moun-
tain area (62.5 %) and 64.1 % got 30 CNY of BPHS fund-
ing per resident (Table 1).
Differences in individual-level characteristics of BPHS
provision
Among 1149 participants, 979 (85.2 %) village doctors
provided high-level BPHS (Table 2). The high BPHS
group had more men and more members between 40
and 59 years old in comparison to those in the low
BPHS group. Members of the high BPHS group had re-
ceived more education and training than those in the
low BPHS group. Those who earned less in total or
earned less public health subsidy were more likely to be-
long to the low BPHS group. Village doctors who
worked in NCMS-contracted village clinics and high-
level integrated management more likely belonged to the
high BPHS group (P < 0.001).
Figure 2 presents some findings in a histogram (based
on percentage of village doctors providing high-level
BPHS). The percentage of high-level BPHS provision in
relation to public health care monthly subsidies showed
a positive trend with increased subsidy. Yet there is no
significant trend regarding the percentage of high-level
BPHS provision versus government funding for BPHS
per person.
Multilevel logistic regression estimates of BPHS provision
Table 3 shows the results of multilevel logistic regression
analysis models testing the individual and county level
factors associated with BPHS provision. Without including
any explanatory variables, 38.4 % of the variance in village
doctors’ BPHS provision came from the county level and
there was significant difference among counties (Model 1).
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After adding confounders, the county level variance
decreased, but still remained significant (Model 2).
In Model 3, village doctors who received more educa-
tion (OR = 1.974, 95 % CI: 1.015–3.838, and OR = 3.459,
95 % CI: 1.438–8.317), more training opportunities (OR =
1.034, 95%CI: 1.002–1.066), and more public health care
subsidy were more likely to provide high BPHS. More spe-
cifically, village doctors who received 1–300 CNY public
health care subsidy monthly provided more BPHS than
those who received no subsidy (OR = 3.564, 95 % CI:
1.795–7.004) and those who received even more than 300
CNY per month provided even more services (OR = 3.886,
95 % CI: 1.683–8.972). Additionally, integrated manage-
ment (OR = 1.911, 95 % CI: 1.096–3.332) and NCMS con-
tracting (OR = 2.005, 95 % CI: 1.131–3.554) increased the
probability of high BPHS provision of village doctors. The
results were quite constant even after including county
level variables (Model 5).
In Model 4, increased FDI index at the county level re-
duced the probability of high BPHS provision. Govern-
ment funding for BPHS was not associated with village
doctors’ level of BPHS provision. After including individ-
ual level factors, the influence of contextual variables
remained unchanged (Model 5), though the exact value
of OR and CI changed slightly. Furthermore, from
Models 2 to 5, the county-level variance decreased by
62 %, which implied that these variables had good ex-
planatory power for the variance in village doctors’
BPHS provision.
Discussion
Our findings show that village doctors with higher edu-
cation levels and more training opportunities were more
likely to be high BPHS providers, consistent with prior
studies in China [36, 38]. This may be because those
with higher education levels and more training oppor-
tunities have better knowledge of BPHS [33, 39, 40]. Be-
fore 2009, most of the training developed by local health
departments for village doctors focused on disease treat-
ment, clinical skill, and basic health care policy [41].
However, since the Health Sector Reform, the central
government has shifted the focus of training to primary
health care [42], especially the norms, standards and ser-
vice delivery paths of BPHS, as recommended by inter-
national studies as an effective way to improve public
health services in rural areas [43, 44]. However, due to
local economic limitations or personal choice, these
training programs were still not necessarily available for
and attended by all the village doctors in China [38].
Thus, to improve BPHS provision by village doctors,
education of and training opportunities for village doc-
tors should be increased, with a focus on knowledge
about public health services.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Sample Percentage (%)







60 + 195 17.0
Education
≤ Junior high school 149 13.0
Secondary school 783 68.1
> Secondary school 217 18.9




Frequency of training in last 3 years 1149 12.7 (8.791)a
Monthly public health care subsidy (CNY) b
None 159 13.8
1–300 678 59.0







County level (level-2, n = 12)
Geographical factor c






Funding for BPHS per person (CNY) b, c
Less than 30 2 14.5
30 8 64.1
More than 30 2 21.4
a Training opportunity last 3 years is a continuous variable, presented by mean
(S.D.) instead of percentage
b USD $1 = CNY 6.199 (June 1, 2015)
c Aggregate variables
d Integral variables
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Table 2 The differences of individual level characteristics by BPHS provision in China







60 + 23.5 15.8
Education <0.001
≤ Junior high school 24.1 11.0
Secondary school 65.3 68.6
> Secondary school 10.6 20.3




Frequency of training in last 3 years a 11.5 12.9 0.049
Monthly public health care subsidy (CNY) c <0.001
None 17.6 13.2
1–300 74.2 56.4







a Training opportunity last 3 years is a continuous variable, presented by mean instead of percentage
b P value by chi-square test in categorical variables and t-test in continuous variables
c USD $1 = CNY 6.199 (June 1, 2015)
Fig. 2 Village doctors’ BPHS provision level under different subsidies in China
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Table 3 Multilevel logistic regression estimates and variance components of provision of BPHS of village doctors, N = 1149 individuals
nested within N = 12 counties
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5




Female 0.828 (0.525,1.304) 0.842 (0.521,1.360) 0.840 (0.533,1.322) 0.860 (0.533,1.387)
Age (years)
20–39 (ref)
40–59 1.433 (0.908,2.262) 1.467 (0.904,2.381) 1.445 (0.916,2.281) 1.474 (0.908,2.390)
60 + 1.495 (0.744,3.003) 1.697 (0.802,3.594) 1.494 (0.745,2.996) 1.685 (0.799,3.555)
Education
≤ Junior high school (ref)
Secondary school 1.694* (0.905,3.171) 1.974** (1.015,3.838) 1.681 (0.899,3.143) 1.926* (0.993,3.737)
> Secondary school 2.628** (1.160,5.955) 3.459*** (1.438,8.317) 2.656** (1.173,6.012) 3.443*** (1.434,8.266)
Average monthly income
Low (ref)
Ordinary 1.853** (1.104,3.111) 1.379 (0.796,2.389) 1.841** (1.098,3.087) 1.351 (0.781,2.336)
High 1.110 (0.680,1.812) 0.992 (0.584,1.687) 1.114 (0.684,1.817) 0.978 (0.577,1.660)
Frequency of training in last
3 years
1.034** (1.002,1.066) 1.034** (1.003,1.066)
Monthly public health care subsidy (CNY)
None (ref)
1-300 3.546*** (1.795,7.004) 3.856*** (1.937,7.678)
More than 300 3.886*** (1.683,8.972) 4.027*** (1.722,9.420)
Integrated Management
Low (ref)
High 1.911** (1.096,3.332) 1.978** (1.132,3.458)
NCMS-contracted
No (ref)




Plain 1.995 (0.390,10.201) 2.761 (0.602,12.671)
FDI Index
Low(ref)
Average 1.276 (0.172,9.470) 1.498 (0.239,9.394)
High 0.159** (0.032,0.784) 0.289* (0.071,1.179)
Funding for BPHS per person (CNY)
Less than 30 (ref)
30 0.726 (0.098,5.370) 0.324 (0.051,2.045)
More than 30 0.334 (0.030,3.706) 0.233 (0.026,2.086)
Variance components
County level variance 2.047*** 1.957*** 1.604*** 1.118*** 0.772***
Intra-class correlation 0.384 0.373 0.328 0.254 0.190
*P < 0.100; **P < 0.050; ***P < 0.010
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The results show that monthly BPHS subsidies at the
individual level exhibit the most consistently positive
correlation with the BPHS outcome. This means that fi-
nancial incentives still play an essential role in scaling up
BPHS provision by village doctors. Although China has
grown to be the second largest economy in the world
[45], with the increase in income per capita, village doc-
tors still earn a relatively low income. Their income is
not only lower than those working in THCs [46], but
also lower in respect to their own income of previous
years [30, 47, 48], due to the switch to the fee-for-
service payment model after the economic reform in the
1980s. Therefore, without any financial support from the
government, they have little incentive to provide public
health services [49]. Thus, the special subsidy for BPHS,
about ¥200–400 (US $32.263–64.527) per month, is a
crucial component of their total income and a strong
motivator for providing BPHS to local residents.
Compared to BPHS subsidies at the individual level,
the government funding for each resident within the ser-
vice population on the county level shows no resulting
difference in BPHS provision by village doctors. This
may be due to inconsistency in the availability and
amount of government funding received by village doc-
tors. First of all, this government funding of BPHS for
local residents is based on both central and local govern-
ment finance and varied in different areas depending
upon local fiscal capacity [42]. For example, the govern-
ment funding for BPHS in Beijing is triple the national
standard [50], while in other provinces it is near or lower
than national standard. This is one major obstacle to
providing high-level public health services in many rural
areas [51]. Secondly, although THCs are required to allo-
cate no less than 40 % of government funding of BPHS
to village doctors, the specific proportion actually received
is uncertain [48]. A previous study in China showed only
a small portion is used to compensate village doctors [26],
which would fail to motivate village doctors to provide
public health services. Thus, more funding should be allo-
cated to village doctors directly in order to improve BPHS
provision in rural China long-term.
Village clinics under high-level integrated management
and NCMS contracting were also more likely to provide
high provision of BPHS by village doctors after control-
ling for other factors. This may be due to the supervi-
sion and support of integrated management as well as
the outpatient reimbursement of NCMS [52]. Integrated
management is a newly implemented policy in the rural
health care service scheme, aiming to manage village
doctors as ordinary primary health care providers under
THCs. Under this policy, village doctors are not only su-
pervised by the public health service standards of THCs
[53], but also supported by advantageous knowledge and
resources through contracts with THCs [54]. Since the
integrated management policy’s creation in 2009, it has
expanded considerably and may cover all village clinics
in the future. The NCMS insurance program includes
considerable compensation for outpatient care of rural
residents and is heavily subsidized by central, provincial,
and county governments [55]. NCMS covers care at
THCs and county-level hospitals, which are public,
government-owned institutions in China. The village
clinics, however, are not all covered by this policy. Our
data showed that only 68.5 % village clinics among the
total surveyed were NCMS-contracted medical institu-
tions. Consequently, patients who do not live near any
NCMS-contracted village clinics would be motivated by
NCMS outpatient reimbursement rates to go to THCs
and county-level hospitals for minor illnesses rather than
to their village clinics [56]. Thus, village doctors who
work without contracts with NCMS would lose their op-
portunities to provide BPHS and face more challenges to
ensure the public health care of local residents. Fortu-
nately, both integrated management and the NCMS are
major policies of the Health Sector Reform in China
with a trend towards expanded coverage of more village
clinics in the future. Together, these changes show posi-
tive steps in policy advancement toward the improve-
ment of BPHS provision by village doctors.
Like other rapidly developing countries, China is ex-
periencing an increase in chronic health issues along
with the resulting social and economic burdens [57, 58].
However, before the Health Sector Reform in 2009,
chronic disease prevention and management received
relatively less attention compared with other basic public
health services. Traditional public health care services
such as immunization and maternal- and child-care have
experienced numerous intervention projects and have
been well-provided nationwide for a long period [59],
while chronic disease prevention and management is
only a newly added item with a low starting point towards
achieving accessibility and equity of provision, especially
in rural areas. Fortunately, the central government and
medicine relative organizations in China have already
begun to increase awareness of this issue and strengthen
support gradually. However, our results showed that the
coherence of current chronic disease prevention and man-
agement policies are not ideal, with space for improve-
ment as discussed above. Thus, other political, financial,
and material support is necessary to improve the remu-
neration and mobilization of village doctors, and realize
the goal of public health service equalization eventually.
There are several limitations in this study. Firstly, al-
though the selected provinces are generally representative
of the typical economic and health development charac-
teristics in China, the study area is limited to three prov-
inces, which may compromise the generalizability of the
findings. A larger geographical area would have more
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external validity. Secondly, the cross-sectional nature of
the study dictates that only correlation, rather than caus-
ation, can be studied. In the future, it would be useful to
perform a more comprehensive study to further research
financial incentives of village doctors’ BPHS provision and
how health care policies influence them.
Conclusion
There is considerable room for improvement regarding
the factors associated with village doctors’ BPHS
provision. Specifically, three key areas have been eluci-
dated in order to increase BPHS provision in rural areas:
(i) increasing public health care subsidies for village
doctors and ensuring transparency in the allocation of
government funding to village clinics, (ii) mobilizing re-
sources and village doctors to provide and attend ample
training programs, and (iii) expanding NCMS contracting
with village clinics and partnering with THCs for inte-
grated management. Expansion and enforcement of
current policies by the Chinese government to address
these factors is essential toward helping to improve acces-
sibility and quality of basic public health care in rural
areas, reduce urban–rural disparities, and increase health
equity nationwide. In addition, as urbanization grows glo-
bally, these findings about the Chinese health care reform
experience may also be relevant for other developing
countries in recognizing possible rural area health
provision shortfalls and designing effective strategies to
ensure public health care.
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medical scheme; CNY: Chinese Yuan; FDI Index: foreign direct investment
index; GDP: gross domestic product; NCMS: new cooperative medical
scheme; THCs: township health centers.
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